

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Dunes

25X1A9a

Bob Amory concurs in

recommendation.

*gmr*  
JSE

11 April 1960

(DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101  
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

CLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	INITIALS	DATE
1	Chief of Operations, DD/P	<i>mt</i>	18 APR 1960
2	A/DOA/A	<i>CPB</i>	20 APR 1960
3	25X1A9a		
4	[REDACTED]	<i>gmr</i>	4/21/60
5	C/SES/DDJ		
6			

ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT	FILE	RETURN
CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

Dick:

25X1A9a

The boss does not think much of this proposal and asked what you and [REDACTED] thought of it.

TO 4.

JSE

Agree  
*mt*

*TO 4 Better not get into this sort of thing. Very hard to turn to constructive advantage. Ray*

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.

DATE

EO/DCI [REDACTED] blp x-8823

18 Apr 60

Executive Registry
100-2744

2746

6 April 1960

100-2037

25X1A9a

MEMORANDUM FOR:

221 - Admin Building

SUBJECT: Harrison Salisbury's Article in Saturday Evening Post,  
19 March 1960.

With respect to the Salisbury article, I would suggest the following steps might be worth considering.

1. Discuss at the OCB level whether there is agreement with
  - a. Salisbury's favorable interpretation of developments in the Soviet Union under Khrushchev;
  - b. His thesis that Khrushchev is seriously apprehensive over the ominous development of China;
  - c. His contention that Khrushchev in the long run will seek an alliance with the West against China;
  - d. His implied recommendation that US policy should move in that direction now.
2. In the light of the findings on the above, the OCB might determine whether
  - a. The Salisbury thesis is one which is favorable to long range US interests and should be followed up tactically and operationally now;
  - b. Any or all of his theses are detrimental to US interests and should be countered;
  - c. His views are without real significance or impact, and should be ignored.

5


DOCUMENT NO.	
NO. OF COPIES IN CLASS.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
1.1. DOD/AS/...	
CLASS. CHG. NO. 10. 10. S. C.	
NEXT REVIEW DATE	11-22
DATE: 8 JUNE 82	REVIEWER: 103430

3. If his views are considered wrong and dangerous, appropriate action might be recommended by the OCB to various Departments.

4. With respect to CIA, our suggestion would be to labor with New York Times editorial personnel through whatever channels are available, to persuade them, preferably, to dissociate themselves openly from Salisbury's views, or at least not to come out in support of them.

I would suggest that such an exercise would be timely not in terms of Salisbury alone. There is a strong current of similar thought in Europe, centering around the so-called Starlinger Thesis. Even deGaulle is believed to be influenced by it. A review of our own long range interest would place us in a better position to react to European pressures in this direction which are likely to grow stronger in the future.

25X1A9a



Chief, SRS/DDI